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ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v, 
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON 
Defendant/Appellant, 
oooOooo 
Case No. 890367-CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Pursuant to Section 24(c) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the Defendant/Appellant, David R. Wilson, submits the 
following Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Respondent, 
Elizabeth A. Wilson, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. As was stated in the Appellant's 
initial Statement of the Case it involves errors made by the trial 
court in its award of permanent alimony; in its failure to award 
the husband what was left of his premarital property; in the trial 
Court's inclusion in the marital estate of gifts made specifically 
to the husband only; and its award of attorney's fees to the wife. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marital History 
No additional facts need be set forth by the Appellant in 
connection with this Reply Brief. Appellant relies on the 
Statement of Facts set forth in his principle brief on pages 4-11. 
In addition the following factual statements made by 
Respondent are erroneous and need to be corrected: 
Respondent's Brief: 
Page 2: Dr. Victor Cline recommended joint custody. 
(TR 473, Exhibit 15) 
Page 5: David's bus driving is not a summer job, but 
rather a nine months per year job. (TR 613) 
David spent 3.5 years preparing for the 
ministry. (TR 53) 
Page 6: David works 3 0 hours per week driving school 
buses and 19 hours per week as a chaplain. (TR 
732) 
David is required to work 39 hours every two 
weeks as a chaplain. (TR 732) 
David's earned income as a clergyman is not tax 
exempt. Rather, contributions made to his 
church were tax exempt. (TR 728) 
Page 7: There is no evidence to reflect David could 
earn an extra $2,000.00 each summer. (TR 863) 
Page 9: David's payment of $6,500.00 to Elizabeth for 
her alleged interest in the Blazer was done 
pursuant to Judge Rokich's Order. (R. 257) 
Appellant also objects and responds to Respondent's Statement 
of the Case as including improper inferences and statements not 
supported by the record. For example, Respondent's Brief pages 8-
9 discusses David's receipt of financial assistance from his 
parents by suggesting that he had at that time incurred $11,000.00 
in legal fees defending the action, had paid the expenses of his 
trial witnesses, and had paid Elizabeth the $6,500.00 ordered by 
the Court for the Blazer. Without specific evidence as to whether 
or not those sums had been paid or were still owed, the attempted 
inferences are not proper to consider in connection with this 
appeal. 
The facts relevant to this appeal are limited to the property 
possessed by the parties prior to marriage, the parties1 marital 
property, their earning history and capacity, and their living 
expenses. The Respondent's Statement of Facts brings in testimony 
and evidence unrelated to the issues of this appeal and can only 
be responded to by respectfully requesting this Court to disregard 
the same. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARDED 
OF ALIMONY 
The trial court awarded to Mrs. Wilson the sum of $250.00 per 
month permanent alimony without sufficient consideration of the 
three factors required to make a proper alimony award. 
One of those three factors is "the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself.11 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988). 
Respondent claims that the findings made by the trial court are 
sufficient to support the award. 
The Respondent relies on the following finding made by the 
trial court: 
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17. The plaintiff was not employed outside the 
home during the marriage. The plaintiff was 
not employed outside the home at the time of 
the divorce. She obtained employment as a 
receptionist prior to the ruling entered 
herein. She is now earning $960.00 a month, 
gross. (R. 253) 
This finding only pertains to Elizabeth's employment history. What 
it entirely fails to address is Elizabeth's earning capacity. To 
that end, Elizabeth is 30 years old and in good health (Tr. 7) . 
She holds a bachelors degree in business administration (Tr. 8, 53) 
and has completed course work toward a masters degree. It is this 
relevant information that the trial court failed to consider in 
light of the low paying job she had then secured. 
A second factor required to be considered and detailed in the 
trial court's findings is "the financial conditions and needs of 
the receiving spouse." Id. Again, Respondent claims the trial 
court's findings with regard to this factor were adequate. In 
support, she points to Findings of Fact, 26: 
26. Based on the standard of living enjoyed 
by the parties during their marriage, the 
incomes of the parties, the needs of the 
plaintiff, and the defendant's ability to pay, 
it is reasonable, just and equitable that the 
defendant should be ordered to pay alimony in 
the amount of $250.00 a month. Said alimony 
shall terminate upon the plaintiff's 
remarriage, cohabitation with a member of the 
opposite sex, or death. (R. 254) 
Respondent claims this finding is adequate because only those 
factors "which it considers most pertinent" need to be included in 
the written findings. However, such general statements as to 
needs, standards of living and abilities to earn are not adequate 
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findings. Rather, they become conclusions that provide this Court 
with no specific factual data to support such general conclusions. 
A specific judicial determination of the financial needs of the 
parties, standards of living and earning capacities is absolutely 
central to any alimony award. Since those specific findings are 
absent in this case, there is no factual basis to make the award 
of alimony. 
Respondent also relies on Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (Utah 
App. 1989), and further argues that any deficiency in the written 
finding may be supplemental by oral findings by the court. The 
Erwin case holds that "findings may be expressed orally from the 
bench or contained in other documents." Id at 849. A footnote 
then refers to URCP 52(a) which states that oral findings are those 
"stated orally . . . following the close of evidence." 
The "oral finding" Respondent refers to was made during the 
cross-examination of David Wilson and, accordingly, not after the 
close of evidence. Even if the statements by the court were 
considered a "finding" it adds little. The court record in 
question reads as follows: 
MS. WOLBACH: Well, if I might, the court's 
position is that the court has plenty of 
information on the following issues: Custody -
- for sure. 
THE COURT: Yes, I have plenty of information 
on that. 
MS. WOLBACH: Okay. And the living expenses 
of the party and their incomes. 
THE COURT: Right. (TR 737) 
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This can hardly be viewed as a finding sufficient on the issue 
of the financial conditions and needs of the parties to fulfill the 
trial court's obligation to make adequate and meaningful findings. 
The final requirement that must be met by the trial court is 
a finding on "the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
support." Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 
App. 1988). Respondent claims that in determining this ability it 
is appropriate to consider the provider's award of other assets and 
David's parent's ability to contribute. 
Respondent's analogy that taking a second spouses income into 
consideration when making an alimony award is the same as taking 
the provider's parent's income into consideration is irrational. 
Mr. Wilson's parent's ability to make gifts to their son is not an 
appropriate consideration when determining Mr. Wilson's ability to 
provide support. They have no legal obligation to support David, 
whereas a second spouse clearly has such an obligation (See Section 
78-45-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953).) 
Respondent also argues David was awarded property to assist 
him in making his support payments. To the contrary, David's non-
interest bearing lien in the marital home, the Blazer, and half of 
the IRA, cannot assist him in making support payments since none 
of these assets are liquid. When these sources of "income" are 
excluded, David's ability to make alimony payments as ordered is 
simply non-existent. 
The trial court erred in awarding Elizabeth permanent alimony. 
Each party was equally educated, about equal in age, and had equal 
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abilities to earn and support themselves. The evidence does not 
support the trial court's findings and those findings fail to 
satisfy the criteria necessary to justify the trial court's award 
of $250.00 per month in permanent alimony to Elizabeth. It should 
be vacated. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT FAILS TO SHOW WHY THE 
TRIAL COURT • S INVASION OF APPELLANT» S 
PREMARITAL PROPERTY WAS PROPER 
In attempting to argue that the manner in which the trial 
court handled the pre-marital property issue was correct, 
Respondent relies on the concurring opinion of Justice Zimmerman 
in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). The majority 
opinion stands for the proposition that a party should have 
returned to him or her the property he or she brought into the 
marriage. 
Respondent does not fall into any of the exceptions to the 
award of premarital property to the spouse bringing such property 
into the marriage as set out in Mortensen. At no time did 
Elizabeth have control of, access to, or any interest in the 
premarital accounts. Similarly, the funds always maintained their 
premarital character and were never commingled. The fact that 
David spent some of the premarital property for the needs of the 
family does not alone change its character. 
Respondent's argument that somehow all of appellants 
premarital property became marital property through commingling and 
use is incorrect. If at the time of the marriage David had put the 
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$37,500.00 cash into a joint account of the parties and then that 
money was used for family living expenses, the commingling and use 
argument would have merit. However, that did not occur. The 
$37,500.00 remained in the account that was in David's name and 
funds were used from that account for family living expenses (for 
which David is not seeking reimbursement) and some were transferred 
by David into an IRA account in his name only. 
If David were arguing for a return of all of the monies that 
were used for family expenses on the grounds that that was separate 
property, that argument would fail. However, he is not requesting 
that. Rather, he is only asking to be returned what was left of 
his premarital property; all of which had been maintained in 
separate accounts in his name only. 
Elizabeth's argument amounts to a "reverse commingling claim" 
and if accepted would result in a windfall to her — the exact 
result Mortensen said should not occur. 
Utah law is clear that premarital property should be awarded 
to the party bringing the property into the marriage. Since 
Respondent fails to point out a valid exception to this rule, the 
portion of the Decree relating to the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset 
Account and David's IRA should be vacated and those two assets 
should be awarded to David in their entirety. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIVIDING 
APPELLANTf S GIFTS AS MARITAL PROPERTY 
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Just as premarital property should stay with the spouse 
bringing it into the marriage, so should gifts to that spouse. 
The trial court erroneously divided the gifts David received 
from his parents as marital property. 
David received a $20,000.00 advance on his inheritance from 
his parents which he used as a down payment for the house. (TR 
713) He received a $13,000.00 gift again from his parents used to 
buy a Blazer. (TR 626) Lastly, he received a $7,000.00 loan which 
he put toward the purchase of the home. (TR 635-63 6) 
The trial court characterized all of the gifts as marital 
property and divided them in half. The trial court's 
misapplication of the law should be reached by vacating the award 
and remand with instructions to the trial court to release David's 
lien on the marital residence to the extent of any such gifts. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF $5,000.00 IN ATTORNEYS 
FEES SHOULD BE VACATED 
David has neither sufficient income nor property to satisfy 
the $5,000.00 attorney's fees that the trial court ordered him to 
pay. If, as stated in Respondent's Brief, p. 3 6 the test for an 
award of attorney's fees is who is most able to pay, David would 
be entitled to an award from Elizabeth. As set forth in 
Appellant's Brief at p. 18, David's disposable income after 
subtracting alimony, child support and child care is $584.75. (R.) 
Out of this amount he must feed, cloth and shelter himself, care 
for the children when they are with him and pay his own attorney's 
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fees of $11,000.00 and $5,000.00 of Elizabeth's fees. Clearly, 
this is mathematically impossible. Further, as discussed above, 
Davidfs property distribution is all non-liquid and no help in 
meeting an attorney's fee obligation. 
Elizabeth's disposable income is $1,602.25. (Appellants 
Brief, P. 18) Although she has the primary obligation to support 
the children out of this amount she nonetheless has far more 
disposable income than David. That becomes even more apparent when 
the extended visitation time the children spend with David is 
considered. 
The fact that the trial court's award is only a part of 
Elizabeth's entire fee is likewise not persuasive that the court 
considered David's ability to pay. That ability to pay is one of 
the three essential criteria that must be considered before the 
amount of any attorney's fee award is considered. By not 
considering that criteria, the award is fatally defective. 
The order should be vacated with both sides bear their own 
fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The entire tenor of Elizabeth's brief reflects her desire to 
have this Court uphold the actions of the trial court on a most 
improper basis: that David's parents are wealthy and willing to 
give David on-going financial assistance. There is no evidence in 
the record to support such a conclusion. David's parents were not 
parties to the action, nor was any evidence solicited from them 
relative to their willingness to assist David in the future. 
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The alimony award should be entirely vacated. The trial court 
failed to made adequate, logical, specifically detailed findings 
regarding (1) the financial condition and needs of Elizabeth; (2) 
Elizabeth's ability to produce a sufficient income for herself; and 
(3) David's ability to provide support. 
What was left of David's premarital property (the Merrill 
Lynch Ready Asset account and the IRA account) should be returned 
to him. 
David's non-interest bearing lien in the marital residence 
should be increased to reflect the gifts given solely to him by his 
parents. 
Lastly, David's obligation to pay part of Elizabeth's 
attorneys fees should be vacated. David simply does not possess 
the property or income to be able to pay such an award. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of^January, 3^90. 
DART, ADAKSQN & KASTZNG 
Kent M. Kast^ng * ~71 
Attorneys for Defendant^Xppellant 
on the Appeal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I caused four true and correct copies of the 
Appellant's Reply Brief to be hand-delivered to the following 
counsel of record on the 18th day of January, 1990. 
JUDITH ROMNEY WOLBACH, ESQ. 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-6222 
/Kent M. Kast 
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